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NATURALISTIC DRIVING EVENTS:  
NO HARM, NO FOUL, NO VALIDITY 
 
Ronald R. Knipling 
Safety for the Long Haul Inc. 
Arlington, Virginia, USA 
rknipling@verizon.net 
 
Summary: This paper challenges the validity of vehicle-based Naturalistic 
Driving (ND) Safety Critical Events (SCEs) in relation to injury and fatal crashes. 
It asserts that mixed SCE datasets have no known or likely representativeness in 
relation to serious crashes and are likely invalid in regard to their causal factors. 
This argument is made in the context of ND attempts to associate truck driver 
Hours-of-Service parameters and safety. But the argument generally applies to 
other mixed SCE datasets. In part, the challenge is to a monolithic “Heinrich 
Triangle.” Crashes are heterogeneous, both “horizontally” within any severity 
strata and “vertically” across strata. Serious crashes account for the vast majority 
of human harm, and are very different from minor crashes. Yet all crashes have, 
and are defined by, tangible external consequences. In contrast, SCEs are defined 
by driver maneuvers. Their datasets contain almost no crashes, let alone harm. As 
such, they are not properly part of the “triangle.” Mixed SCE datasets are 
collections of multiple, disparate driver maneuvers chosen and defined by 
researchers. They are thus contrived, not analytically derived from the 
phenomenon of importance, serious crashes. No valid quantitative inferences 
about the genesis of crash harm can be made from such datasets. This deficiency 
does not invalidate all ND applications, however. And SCE and real crash 
datasets could be linked by systematic sampling and case weighting based on 
objective crash characteristics. 
 
CRASH HARM AND CRASH HETEROGENEITY 
 
The purpose of traffic safety research is to 
understand causes and identify interventions 
relevant to crash harm; i.e., fatalities, injuries, and 
damage resulting from crashes. Research on 
phenomena not verifiably linked to crash harm 
has questionable value. The term crash harm has 
intrinsic meaning but is also defined technically. 
Harm is a quantitative measure of combined 
human and material loss based on monetary valuation of crashes and injuries of various 
severities. Crash harm studies (e.g., Zaloshnja and Miller, 2007) tabulate all the property 
damage, injuries, lost income, and other consequences of crashes of different severities to derive 
unified measures of crash consequences. Some scales include “pain and suffering,” reduced 
quality-of-life, and related extra-economic consequences. Using harm as a metric permits 
objective yet human-centered comparisons across different categories of crashes. 
 
Acronyms 
ND – Naturalistic Driving 
SCE – Safety-Critical Event 
KABCO – Severity scale for police reports  
HOS – Hours-of-Service 
LTCCS – Large Truck Crash Causation Study 
CR – Critical Reason (“proximal cause”) 
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Figure 1 shows a “Heinrich Triangle” adapted for crashes, stratified by the five police-reported 
“KABCO” severity levels coded from the highest crash injury. The levels are: K = Killed; A = 
Incapacitating injury; B = Non-incapacitating injury; C = Possible injury; O = No injury (also 
known as Property Damage Only).  The Large Truck Crash Causation Study (LTCCS) 
investigated nationally representative fatal and injury crashes (K, A, and B). Based on statistics 
in Zaloshnja and Miller (2007), LTCCS-eligible crashes represented just 11% of police-reported 
large truck crashes but 80-90% of known truck crash harm. Specifically, KAB crashes were 78% 
of crash costs, 91% of reduced quality-of-life years, and 92% of lost productivity. Relevance to 
KAB crashes seems required for any study claiming safety significance. 
 
Figure 1. Heinrich’s triangle for police-reported crashes 
 
Beneath KAB crashes are possible injury (C) and no injury (O) crashes. These are almost 90% of 
police-report crashes but only 10-20% of known harm. Beneath police-reported crashes are the 
many non-police-reported crashes. These result in damage and other tangible consequences, but 
few effects to human wellness. Threshold criteria might include reported to insurance, or 
requiring vehicle repair. Figure 2 expands the crash triangle to include them.  
 
Figure 2. Heinrich’s triangle for all crashes (non-police-reported added) 
 
All actual crashes, however, have two pertinent characteristics. First, they have real negative 
consequences and thus intrinsic importance. Secondly, they are defined and classified by those 
external consequences. Regardless of their reliability, crash classifications are independent of 
researcher judgment and are not artifacts of the methodology used to study them. 
  
Underlying Heinrich’s Triangle is the assumption that major injuries, minor injuries, and unsafe 
acts all share the same underlying causal mechanisms (Knipling, 2009, Guo et al, 2010). Yet 
motor vehicle crashes are heterogeneous, both “horizontally” and “vertically.”   Horizontal 
heterogeneity refers to the variety of scenarios seen within any crash severity strata. Road 
departure, rear-end, lane change/merge, crossing path, and other scenario types are all different 
from each other. They can be classified using common descriptors and there is overlap among 
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them, but each major crash type has a distinct profile in regard to when, where, how, and why the 
crash occurred. Crash heterogeneity is further increased by the simple fact that, for multi-vehicle 
crashes, the different drivers usually play different roles; i.e., “at-fault,” or “not-at-fault.” 
 
An example of horizontal crash heterogeneity is provided by Critical Reason (CR) profiles for 
different crash types. In the LTCCS, truck driver asleep-at-the-wheel was the CR (proximal 
cause) of 19% of road departures, but 1% or less of rear-end, sideswipe, and opposite direction 
involvements. Recognition failures (failures to perceive threats) were CRs in 65% of same-
direction sideswipes, but only 14% of road departures. Three fundamental crash involvement 
types are truck single-vehicle (27% in the LTCCS), multi-vehicle truck at-fault (29%), and 
multi-vehicle truck not-at-fault (44%). The first two of these are both “at-fault,” but otherwise 
they are largely different in regard to conditions of occurrence and causal factors. Their LTCCS 
CR percentage profiles correlated only +0.18 across 34 CRs (Knipling, 2009a). The third type, 
truck multi-vehicle not-at-fault involvements, are even more different from the truck perspective 
since the truck generally plays a passive role. A dataset not capturing these categories 
proportionately will be skewed in relation to real crash causation.  
 
Vertically, crash profiles can differ sharply by severity level. Table 1 presents seven objective 
comparisons between 2012 large truck Property Damage Only and fatal crashes (FMCSA, 2014). 
In addition to comparisons shown, a reliable finding is that the non-truck causal contribution 
becomes greater as crash severity increases. This is seen even within the three adjacent severity 
categories of the LTCCS. In truck multi-vehicle involvements, the other motorist was assigned 
the CR (i.e., at-fault) in 54% of B, 63% of A, and 77% of K involvements (Knipling, 2009b). 
Driver impairment also increases with crash severity. Police-reported driver fatigue is about five 
times greater in fatal truck crashes than in all police-reported crashes (FMCSA, 2014).  
 
Table 1. Assorted contrasting characteristics of 2012 Property Damage Only and fatal large truck crashes 
Characteristic: PDO Fatal 
Nighttime (6pm to 6am) 18.0% 35.9% 
Two-way, undivided road 32.7% 53.0% 
Crash occurred in intersection 12.8% 20.4% 
Intersection-related [but not in intersection] 22.9% 5.5% 
Front (of truck) impact 36.1% 58.6% 
Head-on crash, passenger vehicle crossed road center 0.2% 17.7% 
Pedestrian/Pedalcyclist <0.1% 9.1% 
 
NATURALISTIC DRIVING EVENTS AND CRASHES 
 
Naturalistic Driving (ND) Safety-Critical Events (SCEs) are mostly driver evasive maneuvers or 
other dynamic events captured using videos and other instrumentation. A large ND study 
(Blanco et al., 2011) focusing on Hours-of-Service (HOS) related factors captured 2,197 
dynamically triggered SCEs. Yet only four (4) of the 2,197 SCEs (0.2%) were crashes, defined 
as events with “any contact.”  In the 100-Car Naturalistic Driving Study, 69 of 9,125 SCEs 
(0.8%) resulted in “any impact.”  Of these, five (5) caused injuries and another seven (7) were 
police-reported PDO, making the total police-reported percentage 0.1% (Guo et al., 2010). If 
crashes themselves vary greatly in regard to when, where, how, and why they happen, what is the 
likely representativeness of events that are not even crashes? 
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Crash severity categories are defined by their common external consequences. In contrast, SCE 
datasets are collections of disparate dynamic events, each type with its own unique, researcher-
selected criterion. Such datasets are “synthetic.” They are contrived by researchers rather than 
derived from crash characteristics, probability, or harm. In a large HOS-related study (Hanowski 
et al., 2008) the principal SCE triggers were hard-braking, short times-to-crash, and swerves. In 
the follow-on 2011 Blanco et al study, unintentional lane deviations were added as an event type. 
Figure 3 illustrates SCEs in relation to the Heinrich Triangle for crashes. The five ovals represent 
five possible SCE types, each individually defined and then mixed in a dataset. There’s no 
analytic link to serious (or even minor) crashes. How would we know, and why should we 
believe, that SCEs are representative of the distal events at the top of the triangle?  
 
Figure 3. Heinrich’s triangle for all crashes plus multiple SCE types constituting SCE datasets 
 
Hickman et al. (2005) coded 915 combination-unit truck ND SCEs using variables similar or 
identical to those in the LTCCS. There were many similarities to LTCCS profiles, but also stark 
differences, as shown in Table 2. Even a few major discrepancies invalidate assumptions one 
might make about overall representativeness. How would you know which conclusions drawn 
from SCEs have external validity in relation to crashes, and which do not? 
 
Table 2. Contrasting characteristics of Combination-Unit Truck SCEs and LTCCS crash involvements 
Truck/Truck Driver Characteristic: SCE KAB Crashes 
No avoidance maneuver by truck 1.5% 43.8% 
Rear-end event, truck would have been/was striking 43.1% 12.3% 
Rear-end event, truck would have been/was struck 0.5% 5.7% 
Opposite direction event, other vehicle encroached 0.4% 5.6% 
Truck “at-fault” (assigned CR, % of all events) 80.9% 55.3% 
Of CRs assigned to trucks:  
Truck driver critical non-performance (e.g., asleep, ill)  1.6% 6.5% 
Inadequate surveillance (e.g., looked but did not see) 4.2% 6.6% 
Vehicle-related failure 0.0% 4.7% 
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Major ND studies (e.g., (Hanowski et al., 2008, Blanco et al., 2011) have employed SCE rate as 
a surrogate measure of driver fatigue. It’s not. In the Hickman et al. (2005) truck ND study, only 
one of 915 SCEs (0.1%) involved truck driver asleep-at-the-wheel as the CR. That’s compared to 
3.8% in the LTCCS, a 38-fold difference. How can one reliably measure fatigue effects and 
factors in such a dilute testbed?  Further, SCE occurrence seems to indicate driver alertness. 
Wiegand et al. (2008) observed 3,270 truck SCEs and found an inverse relationship between 
SCE occurrence and drowsiness. Relative SCE risk was 1.9 times greater when drivers were 
rated less fatigued. Relative SCE risk was also 1.7 times greater when percent eye closure 
(PERCLOS) was below the fatigue threshold. In Hanowski et al. (2008), SCE rates were lowest 
in pre-dawn hours when fatigue and asleep-at-the-wheel crashes are greatest. 
 
To increase the fatigue content of their truck SCE dataset, Blanco et al (2011) added 1,118 
unintentional lane deviations to an unspecified mix of 1,075 other SCEs. Two scientific issues 
arise; first, there was no crash basis for the number of lane deviations added or the overall mix.  
This is like cooking without a recipe. Secondly, though lane deviations can be “a reliable 
indicator of fatigue,” as the report states, it is not a specific indicator. A prior ND study (Olson et al., 
2009) found 77.5% of lane deviations to be distraction-related; i.e., drivers were performing 
tertiary tasks. Barr et al. (2011) viewed SCEs to compare drowsiness and distraction, and found 
them more opposite than alike. Distracted drivers are generally alert, not drowsy. Blanco et al. 
could have tested the role of fatigue in their SCEs by describing and analyzing them. SCE 
analysis by time-of-day, divided vs. undivided highway, driver maneuvers, single-vehicle vs. 
multi-vehicle, “fault,” specific CR (i.e., asleep-at-the-wheel), observer ratings of drowsiness, 
PERCLOS, or other classifications would have captured and quantified fatigue. Yet unfiltered 
SCE rate was the only dependent variable used.  
 
Few studies have critically examined the validity of SCEs in relation to crashes. A comparison of 
near-crashes and crashes in the 100-Car Naturalistic Driving Study (Guo et al., 2010) was an 
internal consistency check, not an external validity check. Yet its findings are relevant. The study 
compared 761 near-crashes to 69 crashes within the overall dataset of 9,125 SCEs. “Any impact” 
defined the 69 crashes, of which only 12 (0.1% of all SCEs) were police-reported. All the SCEs 
here were gathered in the same study from the same drivers and using the same dynamic 
parameters. Near-crashes and crashes were adjacent categories, all making this perhaps the 
easiest test of SCE realism imaginable. Guo et al found near-crash/crash profiles to be highly 
similar for many descriptive variables, including driver gender, age, lighting condition, road 
alignment, surface condition, and weather. For example, for six codable weather conditions, the 
distributions of near-crashes and crashes correlated +0.99. Several key causation-related 
variables did not show high correlations, however. Most notably, the two profiles for 54 
precipitating factors (e.g., object in roadway, other vehicle crossing straight across path, etc.) 
correlated only +0.18. The correlation between the two distributions for conflict type (e.g., 
single-vehicle, conflict with lead vehicle, conflict with vehicle in adjacent lane, etc.) was +0.44. 
Single-vehicle scenarios (here including object/obstacle and parked vehicle) were 37 of 69 
crashes (54%), versus just 59 of 761 near-crashes (7.8%). A much higher percentage of crashes 
(41/69 = 59%) than near-crashes (244/761 = 32%) occurred under low-traffic conditions.  
 
Guo et al reported that 100-Car drivers reacted to crash threats in only 45 of 68 crashes (66%), 
versus 723 of 760 near-crashes (95%). The report (P. 23) stated that, “this difference shall not be 
considered as evidence against the identical causal mechanism . . . [as it] . . . is considered as the 
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risk factors that trigger the safety events, not the driver's last response to avoid a crash.”  Yet, in 
the classic Indiana Tri-Level causal taxonomy, three of the four main categories of driver error 
are defined by faulty or absent driver reactions. These include critical non-performance (e.g., 
asleep), recognition failures (which delay or fail to evoke a driver reaction) and performance/ 
response execution errors (e.g., steering overcompensation). These three categories, all involving 
absent or faulty evasive maneuvers, were 65% of known driver CRs in the LTCCS (Starnes, 
2006), and 63% in the National Motor Vehicle Crash Causation Survey (NHTSA, 2008). Are we 
to believe that “crash causal mechanisms” do not include driver reactions to threat, or the lack 
thereof?  Or is it that SCEs and crashes may have different causal mechanisms? 
 
Though their report emphasized crash/near-crash similarities, Guo et al (P.48) concluded the 
following: “There is no debate that crashes and near-crashes are two different types of events. 
This is not only true by operational definition but several results in this report demonstrate that 
the two cannot be completely identical. However, this does not eliminate using near-crashes as 
crash surrogates for a specific purpose.” This author agrees!  Specific SCEs may be modeled 
against specific, tightly defined crashes; e.g., hard braking and forward collisions in traffic. But 
the lack of a common criterion or link to crashes across a mixed SCE dataset means that its 
characteristics (i.e., profiles of when, where, how, and why) are not likely to match up generally 
with those of serious crashes. Associations between causal factors (e.g., HOS parameters) and 
mixed SCE datasets cannot be extrapolated to serious crash datasets.  If Guo’s near-crashes and 
“any impact” crashes from the same SCE dataset were “different types of events,” then how 
much more different would be the population of injury and fatal crashes? 
 
SCE rates can be predictive of individual driver crash rates, particularly crashes of minimal 
severity. For 100-Car Study drivers, Guo et al reported a modest but statistically significant 
crash/near-crash correlation of +0.21. Prediction of individual crash rates has both scientific and 
practical importance, but that predictiveness does not imply concordance across crash causes. A 
single driver trait like tendency to speed could account for all or most of the relationship. SCEs 
reflect driver “style.” Driver “style” affects safety, but the factors underlying many serious 
crashes are different, more extreme, and not necessarily apparent from everyday driving.  
 
GETTING REAL 
 
The blacktop slang phrase “No Harm, No Foul!” suggests that behaviors without consequences 
have no significance. A playground scientist might add, “No Harm, and No Verified Relation to 
Harm, No Foul!” There’s a chasm between SCEs and serious crashes. If ND studies must use 
non-crash SCEs, they should at least follow standard best practices of sampling and validation. 
Define, specifically, an external target crash population. Select and refine SCE types and triggers 
based on target crash objective characteristics. Differentially weight SCEs until their profiles 
match crashes. Cross-validate across multiple benchmarks, just as you would validate a survey 
sample against its target population. Ensure that operational measures (i.e., of fatigue) have 
construct validity. Consider alternatives to SCEs, such as driver performance measures taken 
during the lonely highway driving periods when drivers actually fall asleep and crash.  The onus 
should not be on skeptics to fact-check every SCE-based inference.  It should be on ND 
researchers to prove the meaningfulness of their datasets in relation to actual target crash 
populations and to real harm.  
PROCEEDINGS of the Eighth International Driving Symposium on Human Factors in Driver Assessment, Training and Vehicle Design  
203 
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS 
 
The author thanks Leonard Evans and Robert Scopatz for reviewing the manuscript and 
providing helpful comments prior to its submission. 
 
REFERENCES 
  
Barr, L.C., Yang, D., Hanowski, R. J., and Olson, R. (2011)  An assessment of driver drowsiness, 
distraction, and performance in a naturalistic setting. FMCSA-RRR-11-010, Washington 
DC: Department of Transportation (DoT). 
Blanco, M., Hanowski, R. J., Olson, R.L., Morgan, J. F., Soccolich, S. A., Wu, S-C, and Guo, F. 
(2011) The impact of driving, non-driving work, and rest breaks on driving performance in 
commercial motor vehicle operations. Report No. FMCSA-RRR-11-017. Wash. DC: DoT. 
FMCSA. (2014)  Large truck crash facts 2012. FMCSA-RRA-14-004. Wash., DC: DoT. 
Guo, F., Klauer,S.G., McGill, M.T., and Dingus, T.A. (2010) Evaluating the relationship 
between near-crashes and crashes: can near-crashes serve as a surrogate safety metric for 
crashes?  NHTSA Report DOT HS 811 382. Wash., DC: DoT. 
Hanowski, R. J., Olson, R. L., Bocanegra, J. and Hickman, J.S. (2008)  Analysis of risk as a 
function of driving-hour: assessment of driving-hours 1 through 11. Report No. FMCSA-
RRR-08-002, Wash., DC: DoT. 
Hickman, J.S., Knipling, R.R., Olson, R.L., Fumero, M., Hanowski, R.J., & Blanco, M. (2005)  
Phase 1 - preliminary analysis of data collected in the drowsy driver warning system field 
operational test: task 5, phase i data analysis, NHTSA Contract DTNH22-00-C-07007, TO 
#21. Wash., DC: DoT. 
Knipling, R.R. (2009a) Three large truck crash categories: what they tell us about crash 
causation. Proceedings of the Driving Assessment 2009 Conference, Big Sky, MT, 31-37. 
Knipling, R.R. (2009b) Safety for the long haul; large truck crash risk, causation, & prevention. 
Arlington, Virginia: American Trucking Associations. ISBN 978-0-692-00073-1. 
NHTSA. (2008) National Motor Vehicle Crash Causation Survey (Report to Congress, July 
2008). DOT HS 811 059, Washington, DC: Department of Transportation. 
NHTSA. (2014) Traffic safety facts: 2012 data. DOT HS 812 016, 2014. 
Olson, R.L., Hanowski, R.J., Hickman, J.S., & Bocanegra, J. (2009). Driver distraction in 
commercial vehicle operations. FMCSA-RRR-09-042. Wash. DC: DoT. 
Starnes, M. (2006) LTCCS: an initial overview. NHTSA Publication DOT HS 810 646, NHTSA, 
Washington, DC: Department of Transportation. 
Zaloshnja, E. and Miller, T. (2007) Unit Costs of Medium & Heavy Truck Crashes. FMCSA 
Report, http://ai.volpe.dot.gov/carrierresearchresults/pdfs/crash%20costs%202006.pdf, 
Wash., DC: DoT. 
